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Abstract 
This paper examines conflicts between factions in the early British colonial 
administration in the Gold Coast. The reversion of administration control from the 
company of merchants to the Colonial Office generated hostility within the 
administration. Mercantile resentment stemmed from a perception that metropolitan 
control was likely to undermine the results of their labours and jeopardise their 
commercial interests. These circumstances provided a fertile breeding ground for the 
pattern of conflicts that embroiled officials of the colonial administration from 1844. 
However, when allowed the opportunity to influence administrative policy, merchants 
adopted cordial relations with the new officials and readily offered their cooperation. 
This study suggests that we cannot assume that colonial administrations functioned as 
coherent units. Another implication is that uncritically accepting the ‘coloniser’ and 
‘colonised’ dichotomy obscures many important differences within each category and 




Factions and Political Organisations 
This paper examines conflicts between factions in the early British colonial administration in 
Ghana. It adds to a growing body of literature that attempts to revise notions of administrative 
bodies as coherent units.1 Studies of factions within ruling governments, especially when such 
governments have been formed by a governing coalition, have drawn attention to the reality of 
administrative fragmentation along lines of ideology or power struggles.2 Fragmentation is most 
severe in semi-presidential systems or cohabitation where strong prime ministers and presidents 
belonging to different parties often jostle for ultimate political control.3 But even when a cabinet 
is formed by a single political party, they are still not immune to fragmentation. This is because 
political parties, even the most ideologically united, are often divided along factional lines.4 
Divisions at the level of governing cabinets often reflect these divisions at party levels.  
 Such internecine divisions can have profound consequences. By pitting one side of a 
ruling government against the other, it undermines the coherence of the government, preventing 
it from presenting a unified front to the public. Furthermore, these conflicts limit the ability of 
the government to effectively prosecute policies and programmes. As such, factions have largely 
been portrayed in pathological terms.5 However, a more optimistic perspective regards factions 
as crucial in building consensus and achieving inclusiveness in political organisations,6 and 
DiSalvo7 goes to the extent of asserting that factions can force parties to adopt a national vision. 
Regardless of the particular normative assessment, however, factions are understood to have 
important implications for social action within political organisations. 
This literature draws its cases from contemporary states practising some form of electoral 
democracy. These conflicts, although sometimes leading to negative outcomes, can, therefore, be 
assumed to be an unavoidable feature of modern democratic politics. On the contrary, colonial 
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politics can be considered as the very antithesis of democratic politics. Even though a few 
scholars have drawn attention to the fact that divisions existed among European populations in 
colonial societies,8the colonial administration itself is still largely assumed to constitute a 
coherent unit. This image of colonial governments is partly due to a tradition of colonial 
scholarship that pitted colonisers and colonised in perpetual, implacable conflict. Recent studies 
are starting to revise this image of colonial governments painted against a backdrop of a rigid 
dichotomy between ‘coloniser’ and ‘colonised.’ For instance, Lawrance et al9 have shown that 
Africans were deeply involved in the day-to-day running of the machinery of colonial states, and 
that even low-level African personnel were able to manipulate the instruments of colonial rule 
for personal or sectional benefits,10 sometimes even undermining or truncating grand imperial 
objectives. In addition to the foregoing, the coherence of colonial administrations was also 
affected by factions within the colonisers themselves. 
In this paper, I suggest that the pattern of intra-governmental fragmentation characteristic 
of contemporary politics in democratic states were common occurrences in colonial societies. I 
do this through an analysis of long running conflicts between British government officials and 
British merchants who had to serve together in the colonial administration after the London 
Colonial Office took back direct control of the Gold Coast Settlements in 1844. This paper draws 
primarily on archival research conducted in The National Archives (TNA) in Kew, England. The 
archival documents consulted included personal communications, official correspondences 
between governors and the Colonial Office, and petitions. Although the pattern of conflicts I here 
analyse occurred throughout most of the colonial period, in this paper, I focus only the first 
decade of the resumption of government control of the Gold Coast administration, and this focus 
allows for a richer account of events. 
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Mercantile and Metropolitan Regimes before 1844 
The Gold Coast (renamed Ghana upon independence in 1957) was administered by a trading 
committee known as the Company of Merchants until 1821, when this Company was dissolved 
by the British government. A new governor, Sir Charles Macarthy, was appointed under the 
direct control of the government. Macarthy’s administrative style soon led to a war with Asante 
in 1824, in which the British were defeated and the governor killed. In embarrassment, the 
government handed back administrative control to the merchants, who received an annual 
parliamentary grant of £4,000. The watershed moment in Gold Coast history was the 
appointment of Captain George Maclean as president of the committee of merchants in 1830. He 
managed to end hostilities between Asante and the neighbouring coastal states with a peace 
treaty and during his tenure, trade expanded considerably.11 Under Maclean’s personal influence, 
the sphere of British control also expanded.12  
Maclean’s personal reputation allowed him great influence on the Gold Coast.13 In 
England, however, Maclean was less highly regarded. For instance, it was rumoured in London 
that he was not doing enough to supress slavery. In addition, the death of his socialite wife soon 
after her arrival on the Gold Coast resulted in his receiving a lot of negative press in England. As 
a result of the mounting pressure, Dr R. R. Madden was appointed as commissioner to inquire 
into the affairs of the Gold Coast. Based on Madden’s findings, a parliamentary select committee 
recommended that the government resumed control of the Gold Coast. The resident British 
merchants were resentful of this change, and one of them described Madden’s arrival as an ‘evil 
hour.’14 England-based merchants were equally resentful; Forster and Smith of New City 
Chambers, for instance, dismissed Madden’s report as full of ‘calumnious mis-statements.’15 
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Despite this hostility, the government still depended on the resident British merchants to 
administer the Gold Coast. Merchants occupied high administrative offices such as Civil 
Commandants, Magistrates, and Justices of the Peace. With this administrative arrangement, the 
hostilities between government and mercantile factions did not take long to manifest itself. 
Henry Hill replaced Maclean as head of the administration. Almost immediately, he was locked 
in a series of intractable conflicts with the mercantile community. The resentment ran so deep 
that Hill began digging into the records to find incriminating evidence against Maclean’s 
stewardship.  
So profound was the enmity between Hill and the merchants that they often refused to 
cooperate when he requested administrative assistance, and upon his departure from the Gold 
Coast, it was said that he ‘has not left any stone unturned to annoy people of all Classes in this 
Country.’16 His successor, James Lilley, was equally detested. This he attributed to ‘a singularly 
acrimonious feeling…to everything and everyone connected with the Government and towards 
me in particular, for having, as [they] conceive, supplanted [them] in the administration of the 
Government.’17 However, the relationship between merchants and government appointees 
suddenly altered with the appointment of Governor William Winniett in 1847. Winniett quickly 
struck a conciliatory tone with the mercantile community, and for a few years, harmony 
prevailed between the two opposing factions. 
A Question of Administrative Control 
The colonial government enjoyed a period of harmony for most of Winniett’s tenure. However, 
this achievement was not only due to Winniett’s diplomatic approach, but to his having 
surrendered considerable administrative control to the leading English merchants at the 
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commencement of his tenure. The clearest evidence for this comes from an expedition he led 
against the King of Appolonia which was not approved by his metropolitan superiors.  
 In March 1848, Winniett prepared to wage war against Appolonia, a kingdom along the 
seaboard where the colonial administration had very limited influence. He informed the Colonial 
Office that this punitive expedition was necessary because the King of Appolonia was a ruthless 
dictator, and his continuing impunity amounted to a ‘profanation of the British Flag to the 
prejudice of British Honor.’18 The Colonial Office rejected these as legitimate grounds for 
military action and called the expedition a ‘[great] and dangerous mistake.’19 However, the 
mercantile community was fully in support of it. From London, William Forster, one of the most 
important English traders to the Gold Coast, wrote a series of letters to the Colonial Office with 
the intention of convincing the Office of the propriety of the steps that Winniett had taken, and 
suggested that he deserved commendation for his initiative.20 In fact, Winniett sailed to the battle 
on a vessel owned by Forster and Smith.21 
 Contrary to Forster’s claims that Winniett had shown initiative in the Appolonia 
expedition, however, the decision had actually come not from the governor but from resident 
English merchants. It was Francis Swanzy, an old British resident who had drawn Winniett’s 
attention to the Appolonia King’s actions and had stressed the ‘necessity of putting a stop to his 
brutality.’22 Swanzy warned that no ruler on the coast has been as contemptuous of the British, 
and that failure to act swiftly would diminish both the physical and moral force of the 
government: 
If no measures are taken to bring this Chief to his senses, a Chief living on the beach 
where there has been a British Fort, – I am sorry to inform Your Excellency that we must 
of necessity lose part of that consideration and respect combined with fear, with which 
the Chiefs and Natives of every part of the Coast both on the Waterside and in the 
Interior look upon us, – and I will not conceal from Your Excellency that already has this 
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apparent apathy caused remarks to be made by the Natives and by Foreigners implying 
growing contempt of our power and influence.23 
Winniett had been receptive to suggestions from other English residents as well. The resident 
English merchants were apparently controlling policy matters as weighty as the waging of war. 
Thomas Hutton, another resident trader, informed his correspondents in England that ‘[a]t a 
special Meeting Mr Cruickshank, F Swanzy and myself came to the resolution of urging this 
necessary step upon his Excellency.’24 After the successful expedition, Winniett informed the 
Colonial Office of the great assistance he received from the mercantile community, especially 
from Cruickshank and Swanzy, whose ‘exertions were untiring and deserve all praise.’25 
 It is, therefore, clear that, unlike his predecessors, Winniett had an open-door policy 
towards the old English residents and traders on the Gold Coast. The battle against the King of 
Appolonia is a good illustration of Winniett’s attitude to the merchants because of the unintended 
conflicts which it later generated between the merchants and the government. Ironically, it was 
Francis Swanzy, the original mastermind of the battle, that harried the administration over its 
eventual fall outs. This happened towards the end of the governorship of Winniett. For the 
greatest part of his incumbency, however, Winniett enjoyed the confidence and assistance of the 
traders, so long as they were allowed to influence policy. For instance, barely a month after the 
battle against the Appolonians, Winniett had cause again to recommend the service of 
Cruickshank to the Colonial Office: ‘I have on this, as well as upon all other occasions connected 
with the Expedition received the greatest assistance from Mr Cruickshank the late Acting 
Judicial Assessor who I am satisfied has the good of the Government and the welfare of the 
Colony at heart.’26 
 These expressions of gratitude and satisfaction on the part of Governor Winniett were 
duly reciprocated by the merchants. In July 1848, he received an address signed by nine persons 
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connected with the trade and governance of the Gold Coast, who congratulated him for fighting 
and getting rid of ‘a Cruel scourge to the Natives,’ restoring ‘the honor of the British Flag,’ and 
opening up that kingdom to trade and commerce. They hoped that all these happy results would 
be rewarded with an acknowledgement of approval from the British government.27 The address 
was forwarded to the Governor by Cruickshank, who took the opportunity to heap further praises 
on Winniett: 
I most sincerely join in the hope expressed in the address, that your Excellency may 
receive that reward for your important Services, which they so richly merit. I embrace 
this opportunity of thanking you for your uniform attention to all suggestions made by me 
in my Official capacity, which your own judgement led you to believe to be for the 
Public advantage.’28 
 
Cruickshank’s remark that Winniett gave ‘uniform attention to all suggestions’ is another 
indication of the ways in which governors’ attitude towards the English residents shaped the 
quality of relationships in the administration.  
 The Colonial Office, on the other hand, was unimpressed with Winniett’s course of 
action and unmoved by these encomiums. An London officer noted that: ‘The Gov has been 
informed that he cannot be relieved from all responsibility on account of this Expedition until he 
has apprized Lord Grey of his further proceedings in this serious affair.’29 One conclusion 
emerges from these exchanges: while the Colonial Office and representatives of the government 
were alive to the legal and jurisdictional constraints that limited the local administration on the 
Gold Coast, the English traders and residents paid little regards to these abstract constraints and 
concerned themselves more with the concrete solutions to the immediate problems of creating a 
conducive environment for the extension of their trade.30  
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‘Intimate knowledge of the country’: Demands for a Legislative Council  
Their different understandings of the appropriate ways to project British authority contributed to 
the conflicts between these merchants and government representatives. The merchants regarded 
the new officials as unqualified because of their ignorance of the country. They believed that this 
administrative ignorance placed their financial and commercial interests in jeopardy. This 
tension is most clearly borne out in their demands for a Legislative Council. Even though 
resident merchants had been granted access to influence the direction of affairs during the 
governorship of Winniett, they wanted this access to be formalised in the structures of the 
administration. In February 1847, three members of the mercantile community, James 
Bannerman, B. Cruickshank, and J. Clouston penned suggestions for administrative reforms in a 
statement titled ‘Propositions for improving the Government and promoting the prosperity of the 
British Settlements on the Gold Coast.’31 
 The premise of their proposal was that maintaining order and tranquillity in the 
settlements necessitated an intimate understanding of the different coastal states who were 
‘nearly equally matched in strength and jealous of each other.’ If the administrator had this 
knowledge, it would not be ‘difficult for the local Government, by judiciously balancing 
contending parties, to turn the scales in favor of justice.’ This had, in fact, been the policy of the 
Maclean administration, and which had proved to be ‘perfectly adapted’ to the social conditions 
of the settlements. The evidence of the effectiveness of this policy laid in the absence of fatal 
disturbances, the gradual abolition of customs offensive to British sensibilities, as well as the 
wide dissemination of the broad principles of English justice; leading, they claimed, to ‘a spirit 
of happy contentment and attachment.’ Under this state of affairs, commerce had increased and 
flourished. But under the new regime, disturbances had become widespread, lives had been lost 
and trade had been interrupted; and faith in the local government was flagging: ‘…as our power 
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there has been principally that of opinion which cannot fail to be much shaken by these Conflicts 
persisted in in contempt of us. – They were unknown under the former system when confidence 
and unanimity prevailed.’32  
They insisted that without the requisite acquaintance with the people, and their customs 
and laws, officials were bound to fail in all their endeavours. Since the exercise of British 
authority on the Gold Coast at this time lacked any definitive legal basis, it was important to gain 
the confidence and goodwill of the people. Thus, it was necessary that ‘decisions are guided not 
by English law but by the Law of Equity between Man and Man, adapted (as far as is consistent 
with Justice), to the peculiar customs of the People, and to the State of Society among them.’ The 
solution to this quandary, they proposed, was the establishment of a council to advise and 
constrain the governor: 
Under the very peculiar circumstances of our position on the Gold Coast, where an 
acquaintance with the character of the people is so essential to the Governor, it is evident 
that a perfect stranger will encounter many serious difficulties, which might be obviated 
by having recourse to the Council of those, whose standing in the Country entitled their 
opinions to weight. – The Governor may, it is true, enjoy the benefit of such men’s 
Experience, without the trammels of a Council, but opinions expressed by irresponsible 
Persons are not entitled to the same consideration as those of a deliberative body 
legitimately appointed. We consider it therefore a point of no mean importance that a 
Council should be constituted to assist the Governor with their advice, and with the 
power of controuling (sic), to a certain extent, his acts. 
 
They were careful to stress that these observations by no means implied a lack of faith in the 
present Governor Winniett, admitting, in fact, that a ‘Gentleman more devoted to the interest of 
the Settlement, and more anxious to meet the views of the Settlers, and to increase prosperity of 
the natives does not, we believe, exist.’ Their concern was to guard against contingencies ‘such 
as happened under the Government of his predecessor, who made use of a most arbitrary and, we 
believe, unwarrantable exercise of authority in reference to the Commissions of Magistrates.’ 33 
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Continued demands for the establishment of this advisory council came from both 
England and the Gold Coast. In England, Forster, of New City Chambers, deplored the new 
arrangement whereby administrative control rested with ‘persons sent out at random from the 
lottery of Government patronage, wholly ignorant of the Country and the Natives,’ and blamed 
this arrangement for disturbances on the Gold Coast.34 The Colonial Office rejected his call for a 
council on the grounds that it was not aware of disadvantages associated with the extant 
system.35 Bristling at the rebuff, Forster accused the Colonial Office was being on a mission to 
thwart mercantile endeavours in West Africa. He had toiled for three decades to expand British 
trade in West Africa but ‘in place of being aided and assisted, I have invariably found myself 
obstructed and discouraged by the Colonial Authorities, both at home and on the Coast.’36 
According to him, the pattern of official obstruction and sabotage was clear: 
The Settlements on the Gold Coast were handed over to the Merchants in 1828 after 
being completely ruined and disorganised by Colonial Office misgovernance, under a 
threat that if the merchants did not take charge of them and uphold them on terms of 
£4000 a year, in place of from £30,000 to £40,000 a year, which the Colonial Office had 
expended in bringing them to the brink of ruin, they would be blown up and abandoned 
by the Crown.  
After being restored to prosperity by local self government, the Colonial Office again 
resumed charge of them in 1842, and again we find, their prosperity imperilled by the 
blighting influence of that department. It is true that no disasters have yet occurred so 
serious and disgraceful to the British name as those which marked the previous short 
period of Colonial misrule at the Forts, but despite the moral influence which yet remains 
to us from the fourteen years previous good Government, symptoms are not wanting 
sufficient to excite the most lively apprehensions on the part of those exposed to the 
misfortunes that may result from a recurrence of similar misfortunes.37 
 
It is clear from the above that the merchants considered the Colonial Office to be unwilling or 
unable to competently govern the Gold Coast. They were embittered by the anxiety that misrule 
would place their commercial interests at risk.  
From the Gold Coast, Francis Swanzy and Henry Smith also wrote to urge upon the 
Colonial Office the necessity of constituting a council. Citing their backgrounds ‘as two of the 
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Senior Magistrates and oldest residents on the Gold Coast,’ they claimed to have ‘an intimate 
knowledge of the country and the customs of its inhabitants,’ in contrast to the inexperience of 
the new appointees: ‘[a] Governor appointed to the Gold Coast is, as Your Lordship knows, 
generally unacquainted with the Country, its customs, laws, wants, trade, etc. which are all 
peculiar and different from those of any other Colony or Settlement, and which require particular 
management and policy.’ And they invoked the most frightful spectre of the era: the ‘danger 
which might occur by the least imprudence or mismanagement of the Governor in bringing on a 
War at any time with the Ashantee .’38 
The Colonial Office again rejected these demands.39 But Swanzy was tireless in his 
campaign for reform. He drew attention to even more disturbing consequences of the existing 
administrative arrangements. For instance, the Judicial Assessor’s office was chaotically ran and 
lacked any explicit rules regulating it, allowing the assessor to exercise very wide discretion, in 
which he may ‘make his own laws… and give different judgments in similar cases.’40 This 
danger would be easily averted if a council existed. And since the governors sent from England 
were especially ignorant of the society they had been tasked to govern, they needed to be 
‘advised by a council of men whose experience has been gained by long residence on the 
Coast.41 
Swanzy finally got sympathetic audience in the Colonial Office. Earl Grey noted that 
after ‘fully considering all the reasons which have been urged in favour of the measure I have 
determined upon advising H. M. to constitute a Legislative Council at Cape Coast Castle.’42 The 
Legislative Council was duly constituted in April 1850. It was presided over by the Governor, 
William Winniett, and had four members: the Judicial Assessor, James Fitzpatrick; Collector of 
Customs, Edward Staunton; and Civil Commandants, James Bannerman and Brodie 
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Cruickshank. Bannerman and Cruickshank sat on the Council as representatives of the 
mercantile interests.43 
But apparently, establishing the Council was only the first step. The next goal was to 
enlarge mercantile representation. Months after the Legislative Council was instituted, Smith and 
Swanzy again expressed dissatisfaction with its composition. Under Maclean’s administration, 
Council members should have stayed on the coast for at least twelve months. The new Council 
was unsatisfactory. There were serious problems with giving the numerical majority to 
government appointees who were ‘ignorant of the trade and nature of the Country,’ were not 
personally or financially invested in the country, and only considered their service there ‘as a 
stepping stone to a better appointment some where else.’ Thus, the new regime still lacked the 
respect and confidence of the inhabitants, and would face difficulties in the performance of their 
duties.  
Under these circumstances, the administration, by necessity, had to rely on the English 
merchants.44 However, they were unwilling to extend any assistance to the government until 
their membership on the Council was increased. They asked for ‘not one, or two, but four 
members elected by the Merchants and respectable inhabitants, in addition to those selected by 
the Governor for your Lordship’s approval.’45 The Secretary of State, however, dismissed this 
request.46 
Strategic Neutrality: Bannerman and Cruickshank 
Although they were the first to raise the question of a Legislative Council, Bannerman and 
Cruickshank maintained a strategic neutrality in the ensuing struggle to increase mercantile 
representation. Their respectable distance from the fray ensured that they retained influence. This 
strategic stance sometimes meant that they had to side with government officials against other 
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merchants. James Fitzpatrick, a new Judicial Assessor, benefited from this softened stance. In 
many of his early conflicts with resident merchants, he was supported by Bannerman and 
Cruickshank.47  
On the question of the new administrative arrangements, Bannerman and Cruickshank 
rejected claims that the administration would be better conducted under mercantile leadership. 
Against claims that the administration was now weak because of new governors lacked local 
knowledge, they asserted that, in fact, the administration was doing rather well and that those 
opponents of the government who claimed otherwise were misled by the discontent which was 
the natural reaction to social improvements, but which they had ‘unthinkingly attributed to the 
misconduct of the Government.’ They expressed their confidence in the new government. 
However, to further consolidate these gains, they urged the necessity of further administrative 
reforms, including a restructuring of the police force and a proposal for a gathering of chiefs, to 
be called ‘The Assembly of Native Chiefs,’ to function as a means of communications between 
the Governor and the general population.48 
Bannerman and Cruickshank’s neutrality proved effective. In the Colonial Office, Earl 
Grey was pleased with their representations. This was especially so with their recommendation 
of an assembly of chiefs. ‘These gentlemen, have, I think, observed with great truth, that while 
the experiment of affording British protection to the Tribes adjoining the Settlements has hitherto 
been crowned with a success fully adequate to all reasonable expectation… the time has 
nevertheless, arrived when the present system of Administration requires to be expanded and 
modified, so as to meet the exigencies of the rapidly changing state of society.’49 Their strategic 
stance yielded personal gains as well. Both Bannerman and Cruickshank were, at different times, 
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appointed to act as the highest level as Governors, during the absence of the substantive 
Governor. 
‘Despotic power’: James Fitzpatrick against the Merchants 
Relations between government officials and merchants became frosty again with the 
appointment of James Fitzpatrick as Judicial Assessor, the highest judicial office. Fitzpatrick 
came into full collision with the merchants in 1849 during the months when he acted as governor 
in Winniett’s absence. At the core of their discontent were the perceived effects of the 
administrative policy since 1844. In September 1849, Mr Sandeman, a merchant ‘of ten years 
residence on the Coast,’ brought a charge of unlawful termination of contract against 
Fitzpatrick.50 Sandeman blamed Fitzpatrick’s impunity on the defectiveness of the new 
administrative structures, and called for increased mercantile influence on the Council to curb the 
‘despotic power’ the governor wielded: 
It is surely a very hard case as well as Unconstitutional, that a man who risks his all, life, 
health and property, in such a place as this should neither have a vote in the making of 
bye laws & regulations, nor get in Magisterial appointment, the abuses in both 
departments having been carried to an extent amounting to ridicule.51 
Winniett, then on leave in England, blamed the problem on the anomaly of the official 
position that circumstances had forced upon Fitzpatrick. He had not abused his power, acted 
indiscreetly, or been negligent in his duties, but had been forced to fuse judicial and executive 
powers, since he now occupied the roles of Judicial Assessor and Acting Governor: ‘it is 
therefore of that arrangement, and not of Mr Fitzpatrick personally, that I have more particularly 
to speak.’52 Winniett admitted that hostility against Fitzpatrick was widespread among both 
Africans and Europeans on the coast, and suggested that adding the duties of Governor had 
exacerbated it.53 To forestall future recurrences, Winniett recommended that the method of 
appointing an Acting Governor be reformed, suggesting that the Governor be given discretion to 
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appoint the acting officer. The Secretary of State accepted this proposal, but instead of giving the 
discretion to the Governor, he issued a Commission under the Royal Sign Manual appointing 
James Bannerman as Lieutenant Governor upon the death or absence of the Governor.’54 
In the meantime, accusations of Fitzpatrick’s administrative excesses kept pouring in. J. 
Clouston contradicted Winniett’s defence of Fitzpatrick, alleging that Fitzpatrick had personally 
abused his positions: 
As Judicial Assessor Mr Fitzpatrick acted as discreetly as could have been expected &c. 
But no sooner was he installed in the post of Acting Governor than he appears to have 
thrown off all restraint. In that exercise of his temporary authority he has strained it to the 
extent of illegality, asserting Judicial Cognizance and power over Europeans. – in one 
instance proclaiming himself Judge, Jury, and Prosecutor and acting in that anomalous 
capacity.55  
Clouston also accused Fitzpatrick of exercising powers which he did not have in relation to the 
African population. Andrew Swanzy, brother of Francis Swanzy, provided corroboration of this 
charge, referring to Fitzpatrick’s attempt to suppress a ‘native custom’ in Cape Coast. ‘I myself 
saw a Proclamation which was sent to Mr Cruickshank for publication at Annamaboe,’ but he 
claimed that Cruickshank had refused to publish the proclamation ‘on account of the illegality & 
rashness of such a measure.’56 From England, Forster again urged the necessity of administrative 
reforms to safeguard the interest of British merchants against the highhandedness of colonial 
officials.57 
‘Such proceedings are not honorable to the British character’: Swanzy vs Fitzpatrick 
The one incident that had united the two hostile camps later became the source of another 
implacable conflict. The war against Appolonia in 1848 ended with the overthrow of the King. 
Winniett had chosen Bahyinnie, Chief of Atambo, as the King’s replacement. He had then 
charged the Appolonians with the cost of the expedition, and had placed the responsibility for 
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repayment on Bahyinnie. When the payment was not forthcoming, Fitzpatrick, as Acting 
Governor, went to Appolonia with an army detachment to enforce payment, but commotion 
ensued, during which Fitzpatrick and some of the soldiers were attacked and wounded. The King 
was arrested, together with some elders, and brought to Cape Coast Castle, where they were tried 
and sentenced to public flogging.  
This incident roused Francis Swanzy to righteous indignation. He avowed that he was 
outraged by the treatment the king had received, but it was equally possible that he saw this as an 
opportunity to embarrass the government. Swanzy’s own derogatory characterisation of the 
previous Appolonian King indicates that he had not always held the traditional leaders in high 
esteem. Nevertheless, he claimed that his interest in the case was out of a ‘sense of justice 
towards a people among whom I have resided many years.’ He insisted that the unfair treatment 
of the King had undermined the integrity of the government. 58  
This case provided another opportunity to point out the structural weaknesses of the 
administration: ‘as in most other cases Mr Fitzpatrick was Judge, Jury, and Persecutor, as 
Governor and Judicial Assessor he was uncontrolled, and against his verdict there was no 
appeal.’ Swanzy pointed out that the disturbance of which these men were accused was caused 
by Fitzpatrick’s ‘own injustice and illegal measures.’ In fact, he was shocked that given the 
provocation they had suffered, the Appolonians had actually not done something more desperate. 
What was the crime of this noble King, except that of not ‘not immediately satisfying the 
Governor’s demand for Gold’? Such occurrences undermined British moral authority on the 
coast: 
What must have been the feelings of these men while receiving the allotted number of 
Lashes, and how much they must have regretted that, instead of submitting quietly to the 
fancied clemency of Europeans, they did not use the power they had, and set Mr 
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Fitzpatrick at defiance, your Lordship will be able to judge… My Lord such proceedings 
are not honorable to the British character, are deeply injurious to our influence in that 
Country, and calculated to alienate the goodwill of the people.59 
When Winniett returned to the colony, he was instructed to investigate the case.60 After 
he ‘personally made a strict investigation into the whole affair,’ assisted by the Senior 
Magistrate, Mr J. Hutton and the Wesleyan missionary, Revd. T. B. Freeman, Winniett 
exonerated Fitzpatrick.61 The Colonial Office was satisfied with this report but Swanzy was not 
so easily appeased. He called the inquiry ‘a mockery of Justice’ and declared it his ‘duty’ to get 
redress.62 Instead of a ‘strict enquiry,’ Winniett had constituted a committee composed of ‘Two 
private Gentlemen’ at which ‘[n]ot a single Appolonian, no representative of Bahyinne was there 
present; none of them were even invited to appear or informed of the approaching 
investigation.’63 Swanzy put himself in communication with Bahyinnie and other Chiefs of 
Appolonia, and as their spokesperson, announced that ‘the Chief and people of Appolonia are not 
disposed to let the matter rest here.’64 He claimed that Winniett’s self-serving enquiry was only 
possible because of the inefficient way in which the Legislative Council was then operating, 
making the members unable to effectively rein in the governor.  
About five months later, Swanzy again wrote to the Colonial Office through, Bannerman, 
now Lieutenant Governor after Winniett’s death, worried that the Colonial Office seemed 
uninterested in solving this case whereas they had in the past been interested even in trivial 
cases: ‘How different the conduct of Mr Fitzpatrick accusations of the most grave character 
against an Officer filling the responsible functions of Governor and Judge were smothered by 
what it was pretended to call an enquiry...’65 It was now evident that even Bannerman, a 
merchant himself, was getting fed up with Swanzy’s continuing belligerence. ‘I had hoped this 
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matter had been set at rest, and very much regret to perceive Mr Swanzy has revived it,’ he 
moaned to the Colonial Office.66 
But Swanzy persisted, despatching statements from Appolonians to London. His 
persistence finally paid off. London officials eventually came to agree that a more rigorous 
enquiry needed to be made:  
Mr Fitzpatrick I believe made a very good defence and I have not the remotest wish to 
imply any doubt respecting him: but when representations such as these are addressed to 
the Secretary of State, it appears to me that they ought to be scrupulously and impartially 
examined within this office, and that pains should be taken to ascertain how far they may 
contain anything, which throws doubt on the propriety of the manner in which authority 
has been exercised at the Gold Coast, and that if they were only to be disposed of by 
showing them to the Party accused, it would open the door to the most serious complaints 
on the part of those who are entitled to appeal to the Secretary of State for protection 
against any alleged abuse of power.67 
In his response, Fitzpatrick attributed the charges to ill-feelings against him and the government. 
He produced a letter from Cruickshank bearing testimony to his uprightness. While modestly 
claiming to be unworthy of Cruickshank’s ‘lavish encomiums,’ Fitzpatrick still submitted them 
as proof that ‘I succeeded in attaining one of the objects, which should be the ambition of every 
one holding a Judicial Situation, namely, to win & secure the respect of those, who are 
themselves respectable.’68  
But Cruickshank’s support of government officials did not last long. When Fitzpatrick’s 
actions started affecting the commercial interests of the entire mercantile community, it resulted 
in a direct clash. 
 ‘Unauthorized proceedings’: Cruickshank Penalises Fitzpatrick  
The conflicts in which James Fitzpatrick had been embroiled up to this point were with 
individual members of the mercantile class. However, subsequent events brought him up against 
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the entire English mercantile class following his second brief spell as Acting Governor in 1853. 
To forestall the problems which had occurred when Fitzpatrick acted as Governor, the Colonial 
Office directed him to give up the acting governorship to Cruickshank. But this was not before 
Fitzpatrick had taken action on a matter which led to an instant uproar among the merchants. 
When one of the resident English merchants died, Fitzpatrick took it upon himself to 
administer the estate. He personally took charge of the disposal of the asset, and paid himself a 
percentage of the proceeds realised from the sales. Because of the shortage of currency on the 
coast, trade was carried out by a widespread system of debit and credit.69 Since the deceased was 
a debtor to many of the merchants on the coast, they felt personally invested in the matter. The 
trading houses in London that had agents on the Gold Coast also felt invested in the case.70 They 
claimed to have incurred great loses because of Fitzpatrick’s uninvited intervention in the 
administration of the estate. 
The bitterest reaction to Fitzpatrick’s action came from Cruickshank. He pronounced 
Fitzpatrick ‘guilty of maladministration of the Estate’ of the deceased, and held him responsible 
for all losses resulting from the steps he had taken. Fitzpatrick was a ‘Self Constituted Receiver 
of Unrepresented Estates,’ who ‘had neither Authority or (sic) Justification for doing so.’ The 
merchants were also outraged that Fitzpatrick had taken a portion of the proceeds of the 
disposition of the assets as payment for his services.71 Feeling the mercantile community 
threatened by Fitzpatrick’s arbitrary ways, Cruickshank felt ‘compelled … to apply to Your 
Grace for protection for myself and the Mercantile Community generally from the unauthorized 
proceedings.’72  
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In his response, Fitzpatrick made capital out of Cruickshank’s acting as an agent for 
Forster and Smith, charging that Cruickshank’s position on this and other issues affecting the 
administration were affected by his compromised position: ‘Mr Maclean and Mr Cruickshank 
therefore found the usual difficulty in serving two Masters of opposite interests, the Public and 
Messrs Forster and Smith. Neither Mr Maclean nor Mr Cruickshank would be allowed to make 
any matter in which that firm was concerned the subject of pen and Official examination.’73 
Cruickshank was appointed Acting Governor about a month after this controversy 
erupted.74 And a few days after assuming office , he had imposed a punitive leave of absence on 
Fitzpatrick.75 The ostensive cause for this ‘punitive’ action was a petition against Fitzpatrick, 
brought by the rulers of Cape Coast, through four African merchants. They accused him, among 
other things, of being oppressive in the discharge of his functions, and of treating them with 
contempt. The last straw was when Fitzpatrick had tried the King of Cape Coast before a jury of 
commoners, thus lowering his prestige in the eyes of the people. These grievances had excited a 
great agitation in Cape Coast, and they had threatened not to appear in court before Fitzpatrick 
anymore.  
Cruickshank dismissed some of the charges as ‘absurd and frivolous,’ but he admitted 
that Fitzpatrick practised ‘over-severity in the amount of fines imposed’ in his court. But at the 
heart of the matter was ‘what has now become a rooted antipathy to Mr Fitzpatrick, chiefly to an 
ungracious manner in his intercourse with the Native Chiefs and Headmen; to a disregard of their 
peculiarities; and to a contempt not concealed of their dignitaries.’76 These had generated 
widespread ill-feeling for himself in the town, the most deeply felt was ‘the trial of the King, 
which seems to have filled up the measure of their indignation against Mr Fitzpatrick, and to 
have roused them to the desperate resolution of refusing to appear before him in Court.’77 He 
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described the trial as ‘unprecedented and injudicious,’ since a King had never been tried in that 
manner before, in all cases a ‘delinquent King’ being summoned before the governor or the 
assessor, or tried by a jury of his peers. To a ‘sensitive People tenacious of forms and usage,’ 
Cruickshank suggested, this act of Fitzpatrick was bound to cause great consternation, as indeed 
it had: 
…the excitement against Mr Fitzpatrick is so great, that it would be impossible for him in 
their present temper to continue in the discharge of his duties without a collision between 
the Government and the Natives of the Town, which would lead to very disastrous 
consequences. It would not be a difficult matter to force obedience, but it would be at the 
point of the bayonet; and I cannot reconcile myself to the idea of commencing any 
temporary administration of the Government in this manner; especially as I am satisfied, 
that I can by the exercise of a little prudent discretion, restore affairs to their former 
state.78 
In light of this, Cruickshank reported having no other option than to suspend Fitzpatrick, who 
then proceeded to England.  
Fitzpatrick’s suspension turned out to be another instance of ‘unauthorized proceedings.’ 
This resulted in an outrage at the Colonial Office. London officials were perplexed at 
inconsistencies between this action and Cruickshank’s own earlier avowal of confidence in 
Fitzpatrick.79 Opinion in the Office hinted at suspicions that Cruickshank’s motivation were 
more cynical: 
You are well aware of the ancient feud between the mercantile interest at Cape Coast, i.e. 
the mercantile firms in London which trade there, & their agents & dependents in the 
colony & neighborhood, & the local government. The dissatisfaction of the merchants 
has been pressed on this office in many ways (ever since the government was taken out of 
their hands some years ago in consequence of the recommendation of a Parliamentary 
Committee) and particularly in a series of complaints against Mr Fitzpatrick the judicial 
assessor…. Mr Brodie Cruickshank, the now acting Governor, is (or was until he became 
acting governor) agent to Messrs Forster & Smith, the chief of these London houses. He 
is also a man of much ability, and influence on the coast. He has moreover a violent 
personal quarrel with Mr Fitzpatrick (on the subject of the admin. of estates.) Mr Brodie 
Cruickshank was sworn in on the 27th August, & in ten days he had got rid of his “Chief 
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Justice & Judicial Assessor” … on account of his “unpopularity” which convince Mr C. 
that the government could not be carried on while he continued to deal justice to the 
natives. 
This unpopularity merely rested on the natives’ “belief that they had grievances” a belief 
which no doubt Mr Cruickshank’s employers and friends have done their utmost to 
encourage. 80 
The Colonial Office conveyed to Cruickshank its extreme displeasure at the course he 
had taken.81 He was eventually replaced and the new Governor requested the Colonial Office to 
immediately send out Fitzpatrick, who was then in England, to resume his duties as Judicial 
Assessor.82 But Fitzpatrick’s actions caught up with him in England and he would never again 
return to the Gold Coast. The London merchants, whose interests had been affected by his 
disposal of the deceased merchant’s estate, brought a suit against him in the Chancery Court.83 
He resigned his position on the Gold Coast in order to fight these legal battles, which eventually 
brought him to financial ruin.84  
Summary   
The circumstances surrounding the reversion of the Gold Coast administration to Colonial Office 
control generated distrust and hostility between the two British factions on the Gold Coast: 
merchants and government officials. The hostility between these factions often broke out in open 
conflict because they needed to work together in the same administration. Mercantile resentment 
stemmed from sense of being entitled to administer the Gold Coast. This sense of entitlement 
derived from their contention that, with limited metropolitan assistance, they had been able to 
steer the affairs of the colony with great success after the government had decided to withdraw 
from the coast. They, thus, perceived the resumption of direct metropolitan control as an attempt 
to undermine the results of their decades-long effort and jeopardise their commercial interest. 
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These circumstances provided a fertile breeding ground for the pattern of conflicts that 
rocked the administration from 1844. Embittered by the fact that they had been supplanted in the 
administration that they themselves had built up, they took every opportunity to antagonise the 
new officials whom they considered to be usurpers. But as I have shown above, underlying these 
acrimonious relations was a sustained struggle to regain administrative control. When allowed 
the opportunity to influence administrative policy, the merchants adopted cordial relations with 
the new officials. But more than informal control, what the merchants most desired was to 
instigate administrative reforms which would institutionalise their influence in the new regime.  
To gain the desired institutional influence, they embarked on a campaign for the 
formation of a Legislative Council. The two main reasons upon which this demand was premised 
also explain their antipathy to their colleague officials. First, they reasoned that ‘intimate 
knowledge’ of the country was necessary to effectively govern, and as long-time residents, they 
were the most suited for the task. In contrast, their rivals arrived on the coast totally ignorant of 
the country they had been appointed to rule. The second premise of their campaign was that as 
traders who had resided on the Gold Coast for years, they had developed commercial and 
emotional attachments which compels them to place the welfare of the public first. They feared 
that new government appointees, lacking any social or commercial ties to the country, would be 
given to recklessness in the discharge of their duties. 
These patterns of conflicts between English merchants and government officials 
continued well into the late colonial period. In the decades following the government takeover of 
the administration, British merchants sometimes joined forces with African elites to challenge 
many government actions, such as protests over the imposition of taxes or increases in customs 
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duties, or struggles for increased representation of Africans or merchants in the colonial 
government.85  
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have argued that the Gold Coast colonial administration cannot be considered as a 
coherent organ. This is in line with political science scholarship which examines factions and 
fragmentations in governments and parties. This literature has started drawing attention to 
dangers in the ‘assumption that parties [and governments] are unitary actors.’86 If colonial 
personnel were as divided as I have portrayed them in this paper, it would suggest that colonial 
governments often lacked the kinds of operational efficiency which is usually ascribed to them in 
the colonial studies literature. It would mean, for instance, that scholars would need to take more 
seriously, and study more cautiously the network of personal and factional relations in which 
colonial officials were involved, and the implications of these set of relationships for colonial 
policy formulation.  It would also mean that we should adopt a more open approach to the 
common categories of colonial studies.  
This does not mean that terms like ‘coloniser’ and ‘colonised’ should be discarded. 
However, as Cooper87 had admonished, they should be considered as terms which serves to open 
up a line of enquiry, rather than foreclosing careful analytical work. As I have shown in this 
paper, uncritically accepting the categories of ‘coloniser’ and ‘colonised’ would not only obscure 
the many important differences within each category, but, more crucially, would blind us to the 
important social and political implications of these internal divisions. Although there were so 
many potential lines of division in any colonial society – for instance, colonial officials, 
merchants, missionaries, travellers – my focus on only two of these groups have shown the 
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